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Imagine drawing a hot bath in the privacy of your home after a 
long, hard day at work.  Now imagine that even with the shades 
drawn and the doors shut, a government agent across the street 
knew the exact moment that you were taking a bath.
Is your home truly private?  Most people in the United States 
believe that their homes are places of privacy.  The Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees
individuals the right to be secure from unreasonable government
        †     William Mitchell College of Law, J.D. Candidate 2003. 
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searches within the sanctity of their homes.1
The Supreme Court’s decision in Kyllo v. United States2
addressed the question of privacy within a person’s home.3  With 
the advancing technology of government surveillance, law
enforcement now has the capability to locate and measure the use 
of heat within a home using thermal imagers.4  Thermal imagers 
are devices frequently used by law enforcement to locate high 
intensity lights primarily used for the indoor cultivation of
marijuana.5 Unfortunately, however, these thermal imagers do not 
distinguish between heat from lights used for illegal activities, such 
as marijuana growing, and the heat released from legal activities, 
such as taking a hot bath in one’s home.6  In Kyllo, the Supreme 
Court decided that the warrantless use of thermal imagers was a 
search and thus violated the Fourth Amendment.7
This note examines the constitutionality of using a thermal 
imager without a search warrant.  Part II presents the history of 
thermal imagers and the Fourth Amendment, how the Fourth 
Amendment applies to the use of thermal imagers on private 
houses, and how courts have ruled on the constitutionality of 
thermal imagers in the past.8  Part III details the facts and decision 
of the Kyllo case.9  Part IV analyzes the decision, along with the 
ramifications of the decision within the wake of September 11, 
2001, and changing public quest for more security, perhaps at the 
possible cost of personal freedoms.10  Part V concludes that the 
Supreme Court correctly ruled that use of thermal imagers should 
constitute a search; however, the Court incorrectly ruled that their 
decision should encompass all sense-enhancing technology.11
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 28-30.
5. See id.
6. People v. Deutsch, 44 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1231 (1996) (stating that a 
thermal imager is indiscriminate in registering sources of heat).
7. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
8. See infra Part II.A-C.
9. See infra Part III.A-B.
10. See infra Part IV.A-C.
11. See infra Part V.
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II. HISTORY
A. Fourth Amendment Protection
“At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right 
of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from 
unreasonable governmental intrusion.”12  The people of the United 
States expect a certain degree of privacy from government
intrusion within their homes.13  This expectation of privacy is 
primarily protected under the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution:14
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.15
The Fourth Amendment protects an individual’s privacy by 
restricting the government’s power of investigation and by
prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures.16  The Fourth 
Amendment applies to states through the Due Process Clause set 
forth in the Fourteenth Amendment.17
To comply with the Fourth Amendment when planning to 
search an individual’s property, law enforcement must first obtain a 
search warrant.18  To obtain a search warrant, law enforcement 
must contact a magistrate judge and demonstrate probable cause 
12. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (citing Boyd v. 
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)) (describing how the Court has never allowed 
federal law enforcement to enter an individual’s home without consent or a 
warrant).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) 
(“Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 350 (discussing how the 
Fourth Amendment protects against certain kinds of governmental intrusions 
(such as searches and seizures), while other Constitutional provisions and state 
laws protect against other aspects of an individual’s privacy).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
16. See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 350.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 (declaring that no state shall institute a law 
that violates a person’s rights set forth in the United States Constitution); see also
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (applying the federal exclusionary rule to 
states regarding evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment).
18. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(1).
3
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that evidence of a crime will be located at a specific place.19  The 
magistrate then may or may not authorize law enforcement to 
conduct a search based on the degree of probable cause that law 
enforcement can demonstrate.20  Evidence obtained without a 
search warrant violates the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule 
and is barred from use at trial.21
Courts originally limited the Fourth Amendment strictly to 
matters of property.22  The government had to physically trespass 
onto a claimant’s property in order to make a successful claim 
under the Fourth Amendment.23  Limiting the Fourth Amendment 
to mere searches and seizures of tangible property has now been 
rejected, partly due to the ever-increasing technological advances 
in law enforcement’s investigation and surveillance techniques.24
19. Id.  See also HARRY I. SUBIN ET AL., THE CRIMINAL PROCESS: PROSECUTION
AND DEFENSE FUNCTIONS §6.4(b) (1993) (“Since the purpose of the search warrant
is to search for and seize evidence instrumentalities, fruits of a crime, or
contraband, the warrant must specifically designate the items to be seized, and the 
whereabouts of this material.”).
20. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(1); see also SUBIN ET. AL., supra note 19, at §6.4(b) 
(relating how search warrants are most often judged on practical accuracy and not 
technical sufficiency); see, e.g., Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 86-87 (1987) 
(holding that a search warrant was not in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
when law officers searched two apartments for evidence, one of which was
erroneously included in the warrant, and their conduct and the limits of the 
search were based on the information available as the search proceeded).
21. 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & DAVID C. BAUM, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 474 (1978).  There are a number of exceptions to the 
exclusionary rule. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907-08 (1984)
(explaining that under the “good faith exception” evidence will still be in
situations where officers reasonably rely on a search warrant that later is held to be 
unsupported by probable cause); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 432 (1984) 
(holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply when the illegally obtained 
evidence would have been inevitably or ultimately discovered through lawful 
activity); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171 (1969) (holding an
exception when the illegally obtained evidence is applied to a suspect whose 
Fourth Amendment rights had not been violated); Walder v. United States, 347 
U.S. 62, 62 (1954) (holding an exception when the evidence is admitted to 
impeach the credibility of the suspect).
22. See e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); Goldman v. 
United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).  Previously, these cases were not held to violate 
the Fourth Amendment because property was not trespassed upon.  The holding 
that the Fourth Amendment cannot be violated unless property is trespassed upon 
has been subsequently overturned. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 
510-12 (1961) (holding that a trespass upon property is not necessary for a Fourth 
Amendment violation, rather it is sufficient that there has been an “actual
intrusion into a constitutionally protected area”).
23. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466; Goldman, 316 U.S. at 134-35.
24. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (holding that the 
4
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With the government’s use of increasingly sensitive and
sophisticated technology, law enforcement can now investigate and 
discover personal details about individuals without physically
trespassing upon their property.25  This new type of investigative 
technology, sometimes referred to as “sense-enhancing
technology,”26 threatens individuals’ rights to privacy under the 
Fourth Amendment.27  Using sense-enhancing technology, law 
enforcement can fly hundreds of feet above suspected offenders’ 
property and see it clearly with high-powered camera equipment.28
Using electronic listening devices, law enforcement can listen to a 
suspect’s conversation without being in the same building.29  Law 
enforcement can even stand outside a suspect’s property and, using 
a thermal imager, take thermal images of any heat emitted from 
objects within that home, including heat images accurate enough 
to detect a human heartbeat.30  As this type of sense-enhancing
investigative technology continues to advance, an individual’s
privacy continues to dissipate.31
Out of all sense-enhancing technology, the use of thermal 
“trespass doctrine” has thoroughly eroded and that the government’s electronic 
listening, which did not involve a trespass, was a violation of an individual’s Fourth 
Amendment privacy rights).
25. See Jennifer Murphy, Comment, Trash, Thermal Imagers, and the Fourth 
Amendment: the New Search and Seizure, 53 SMU L. REV. 1645, 1645-51 (2000) 
(discussing types of surveillance technology that are legally permissible).
26. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (discussing technology that 
improves human senses and has potential to gather information which could not 
otherwise be obtained without physical trespass).
27. A. Michael Froomkin, Symposium, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1461 (2000).
28. See, e.g., Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 229 (1986) 
(involving law enforcement’s use of a precision aerial mapping camera placed in 
an airplane to take pictures of an area hundreds of feet away); Cal. v. Ciraolo, 476 
U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (holding that a picture taken from 1000 feet above
respondent’s yard in an airplane was sufficient evidence to secure a search
warrant).
29. Katz, 389 U.S. at 354-55.
30. Jeffrey P. Campisi, Comment, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:
The Constitutionality of Thermal Imaging, 46 VILL. L. REV. 241, 245 (2001); Jonathon 
Todd Laba, Comment, If You Can’t Stand the Heat, Get Out of the Drug Business: 
Thermal Imagers, Emerging Technologies, and the Fourth Amendment, 84 CAL. L. REV.
1437, 1466 (1996). See also United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1509 (10th
Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds by 83 F.3d 1247, 1251-66 (10th Cir. 1996) 
(McKay, J., dissenting) (noting that thermal imagers have the ability to recognize 
distinct images and that this technology is becoming available to law
enforcement).
31. Cusumano, 67 F.3d at 1509.
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imagers may pose the greatest risk to the Fourth Amendment.
Instead of people being secure in their homes, the “[u]se of a 
thermal imager enables the government to discover that which is 
shielded from the public by the walls of the home.”32
B. What Are Thermal Imagers?
Thermal imagers have been used by the military for quite 
some time, but are relatively new to law enforcement agencies.33
Over the past decade thermal imagers have been increasingly 
employed by law enforcement.34  Closely resembling a video
camera, the thermal imager measures the amount of heat emitted 
from an object or structure.35  The imager detects heat emitted 
from objects and radiated from enclosed structures.36  The imager 
converts the detected heat into a color image.  The hotter an 
object, the brighter the object will appear in the imager;
conversely, the cooler the object, the darker it appears.37
32. Murphy, supra note 25, at 1649 (stating that the new surveillance
technology allows the observer to search an individual’s most private belongings 
without the need of a search warrant).
33. Thomas D. Colbridge, Thermal Imaging: Much Heat but Little Light, F.B.I. L. 
ENFORCEMENT BULL., 18 Dec. 1997, at 19 (stating that the use of thermal imaging is 
not new, but only recently employed by law enforcement); Janice Fioravante, Night
Sight, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Feb. 26, 1995, at A6 (stating that the military has used 
thermal imagers for surveillance, reconnaissance, and navigational assistance since 
the 1970’s, and recently this technology is being used by law enforcement); 
Kathleen A. Lomas, Note, Bad Physics And Bad Law: A Review of the Constitutionality 
Of Thermal Imagery Surveillance After United States v. Elkins, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 799, 800 
(2000) (stating that thermal imaging technology has long been available to the 
United States military).
34. Campisi, supra note 30, at 241; Scott J. Smith, Note, Thermal Surveillance 
and the Extraordinary Device Exception: Re-Defining the Scope of the Katz Analysis, 30 VAL.
U. L. REV. 1071, 1117 (1996) (stating that “[t]hermal imagery has emerged across 
the country as the government’s most recent weapon in its war on drugs”).
35. Joy Archer Yeager, Annotation, Permissibility and Sufficiency of Warrantless 
Use of Thermal Imager or Forward Looking Infra-Red Radar (F.L.I.R.), 78 A.L.R. 5th 309, 
§2(a) (2000) (explaining that all objects with a temperature above absolute zero 
emit some radiation; the hotter the object, the more infrared radiation the object 
will emit).
36. Id. (stating that most thermal imagers do not actually penetrate the wall 
of a structure to measure an object’s radiation level, but instead the imager 
measures an object’s radiation level as the heat escapes through that structure to 
the outside).
37. Colbridge, supra note 33, at 19 (relating that thermal imagers do not 
measure temperature of the object being targeted, but only the relative
temperature of different areas of the object; these differences are then displayed 
in various shades of gray, the hotter areas are lighter gray and cooler areas appear 
darker).
6
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When officers suspect that marijuana is being cultivated in a 
house, law enforcement may use a thermal imager to search for 
high-intensity heat lamps that are often utilized for marijuana 
growth.38  High-intensity lights emit infrared radiation that can be 
readily detected by imagers when heat is radiating from a house.39
After taking heat readings of a structure through a thermal imager, 
law enforcement compares how hot that structure is to
surrounding structures.40  In the past, if an extraordinary amount of 
heat was radiating from an area of the structure in a pattern 
indicating the presence of heat lamps, law enforcement could use 
that information to assist in obtaining a search warrant from a 
magistrate judge.41
C. Constitutionality of Thermal Imagers Prior to the Supreme Court’s 
Decision in Kyllo v. United States
In the early 1990s, as the use of thermal imagers in police 
investigation grew,42 court dockets were being filled with cases 
questioning whether using thermal imagers without a search
warrant constituted a search in violation of an individual’s Fourth 
Amendment rights.43  The majority of courts ruled that the
warrantless use of thermal imagers was not a search, but rather an 
38. Yeager, supra note 35, at 309.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Mindy G. Wilson, Note, The Prewarrant Use of Thermal Imagery: Has This 
Technological Advance in the War Against Drugs Come at the Expense of Fourth
Amendment Protections Against Unreasonable Searches?, 83 KY. L.J. 891, 893 (1994-
1995) (stating that law enforcement uses thermal imaging technology to
“supplement the probable cause necessary to obtain a search warrant and
contribute to the discovery and eradication of indoor [marijuana] operations”);
Yeager, supra note 35, at §2(a) (stating that other evidence is often used in
combination with the thermal images to establish probable cause for search 
warrants). Evidence used in combination with thermal images has included the 
odor of marijuana, information from informants, and reports of gunfire form the 
suspected premises. United States v. Kerr, 876 F.2d 1440, 1445 (9th Cir. 1989).  In 
addition, the defendant’s purchase of garden supply equipment, observations of 
marijuana stems in the garbage, and boarded up windows have also served as 
supplemental evidence in such cases.  United States v. Deaner, 1 F.3d 192, 196-197
(3rd Cir. 1993); Kyllo v. United States, 190 F.3d 1041, 1044 (9th Cir. 1999)
42. United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325, 1327 (11th Cir. 1995)
(“Increasingly, law enforcement personnel are using . . . thermal imaging to detect 
indoor marijuana growing operations.”).
43. See United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 853 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that 
the warrantless use of thermal imagery has spawned a fair deal of debate).
7
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acceptable police investigative practice.44  Several other courts, 
however, held that the use of thermal imaging was a search that 
required a search warrant.45  Regrettably, these courts failed to 
come to a consensus and squarely address the constitutionality of 
thermal imagery.46
The test set forth in Katz v. United States47 has been the standard
for determining the constitutionality of the use of new police 
surveillance technology, including thermal imagers.48  Justice
Harlan’s concurrence in Katz set forth a conjunctive two-prong test 
to determine whether certain police activities violate the Fourth 
Amendment.49  To succeed on an argument that a search was in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment, an individual must prove: (1) 
a subjective expectation of privacy regarding the challenged search; 
and (2) that society recognizes that expectation as reasonable.50
The Katz test is conjunctive; if either prong is not satisfied, the 
police activity in question will not be deemed to be in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment.51  In spite of the framework provided by 
the Katz test for gauging the constitutionality of thermal imagers, 
courts have applied a variety of rationales in ruling that the use of a 
thermal imager is or is not a “search” under the Fourth
Amendment.52
44. Kyllo, 190 F.3d at 1041; Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1325; United States v. Myers, 
46 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 1994); 
United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992 (11th Cir. 1994); Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 850; United 
States v. Domitrovich, 852 F. Supp. 1460 (1994); United States v. Porco, 842 F. 
Supp. 1393 (D.Wyo. 1994); United States v. Deaner, 1992 WL 209966 (M.D.Pa. 
July 27, 1992); United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220 (D.Haw. 1991), 
aff’d, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993).
45. Commonwealth v. Gindlesperger, 743 A.2d 898 (Pa. 1999); State v.
Siedgel, 934 P.2d 176 (Mont. 1997), reversed on other grounds; People v. Deutsch, 44 
Cal. App. 4th 1224 (1996); United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497 (10th Cir. 
1995); State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593 (Wash. 1994).
46. See Lomas, supra note 33, at 800 (stating that the debate over the
constitutionality of the warrantless use of thermal imagery “is a continuing source 
of contention within and among the circuits”).
47. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
48. Id. See Campisi, supra note 30, at 247; Thomas B. Kearns, Note, Technology
and the Right to Privacy: The Convergence of Surveillance and Information Privacy
Concern, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 975, 985 (1999) (explaining the application of 
the reasonable expectation of privacy test to recent surveillance technology); 
Smith, supra note 34, at 1071.
49. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 360-62.
51. See id.
52. Campisi, supra note 30, at 247.
8
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1. Ruling That Thermal Imagers Are Not A Search Under the 
Fourth Amendment
The majority of courts have ruled that the utilization of
warrantless thermal imaging is not a search under the Fourth 
Amendment.53  These courts often employ one, two or all of the 
following three arguments in rationalizing why the Katz test is not 
passed.54  One argument claims that thermal imaging is a non-
intrusive device, and therefore not a search.55  Another argument 
analogizes the heat waste measured by thermal imagers with the 
legal status of cases involving the apprehension of discarded
garbage.56  The third argument analogizes thermal imaging to the 
warrantless use of canines trained to sniff-search for drug
contraband.57
a. Non-Intrusiveness of Thermal Imagery
When law enforcement uses thermal imagers on private
homes, the imagers measure only the heat escaping to the outside 
of those homes.58  The Fourth Amendment provides security to 
individuals from unreasonable searches within their homes.59
Therefore, many courts have concluded that thermal imaging scans 
are non-intrusive and thus are not searches because the imagers 
measure heat escaping outside of the home and the Fourth
Amendment only protects an individual from searches within his or 
53. Kyllo v. United States, 190 F.3d 1041, 1041 (9th Cir. 1999); United States
v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 
850, 857 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668, 668 (7th Cir. 1995); 
United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 997 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Pinson, 
24 F.3d 1056, 1056 (8th Cir. 1994); States v. Domitrovich, 852 F. Supp. 1460, 1472-
75 (1994); United States v. Porco, 842 F. Supp. 1393, 1396-98 (D.Wyo. 1994). See
Lomas, supra note 33, at 809 (noting that the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh 
Circuits, and the Ninth Circuit upon rehearing, have concluded that the
warrantless use of thermal imagery was constitutional); Campisi, supra note 30, at 
297 (noting that a majority of courts considering the issue have held warrantless 
searches of thermal imagers to be constitutional).
54. Campisi, supra note 30, at 249.
55. See Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1330 (“[T]here was no intrusion whatsoever . . .
because [the heat] rose from [the] house and then was measured by the [thermal 
imager].”).
56. Campisi, supra note 30, at 249; see, e.g. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 
35 (1988). See also Ford, 34 F.3d at 997.
57. Campisi, supra note 30, at 249; see, e.g. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 
(1983).
58. Yeager, supra note 35, at 309.
59. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
9
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her home.60  In United States v. Penny-Feeny,61 the Ninth Circuit held 
that because the thermal imager “did no more than gauge and 
reflect that amount of heat that emanated from the residence,”
there was no intrusion into the house and therefore the thermal 
scan did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.62
The Seventh Circuit similarly held that a thermal scan was not a 
search under the Fourth Amendment because the thermal scan 
“does not intrude in any way into the privacy and sanctity of a 
home.”63  Therefore, under the second prong of the Katz test, 
society will not recognize this expectation of privacy as reasonable.64
Courts have also noted the lack of intimate detail that thermal 
imagers actually display in ruling these thermal scans to be non-
intrusive and not searches.65  In United States v. Robinson,66 the 
60. See Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1329 (holding that there was no intrusion because 
the heat rose from the house and then was measured by the thermal imager).
61. United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 227-28 (D.Haw. 1991), 
aff’d, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993).
62. Id. at 227-28. See also United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 
1994).  Joseph Pinson’s home was the subject of aerial surveillance by means of a 
thermal imager mounted on the undercarriage of a helicopter. Id.  This 
surveillance was undertaken after he received three packages from companies 
known to be suppliers of indoor marijuana-growing equipment and was found to 
have been using an inordinate amount of electricity. Id. at 1057.  The thermal 
scan displayed an excessive amount of heat on the third floor, and a search 
warrant was issued. Id.  The search revealed marijuana plants, marijuana
equipment, and various books on marijuana cultivation.  Id.  Pinson argued the 
use of the thermal imager without a search warrant violated his Fourth
Amendment rights. Id.
The Eighth Circuit held that Pinson did not demonstrate a subjective 
expectation of privacy because the thermal imager did nothing more than gauge 
the heat emanating from the house. Id. at 1058. Furthermore, even if Pinson was 
capable of demonstrating a subjective expectation of privacy, society was not 
willing to recognize such abandoned heat as meeting the definition of a
reasonable expectation of privacy. Id.
63. United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668, 670 (7th Cir. 1995).
64. Id. (holding that thermal imaging is not a violation of the Fourth
Amendment because it does not pass the second prong of the Katz test).
65. Kyllo v. United States, 190 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that 
the district court was not in error when it described the capabilities of the device 
as merely displaying a crude image of heat, not depicting any people or activities); 
Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1330; United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 996 (11th Cir. 1994) 
(noting that the thermal imaging scan was “of such low resolution as to render it 
incapable of revealing the intimacy of detail and activity protected by the Fourth 
Amendment”). See also United States v. Depew, 992 F. Supp. 1209, 1209 (D. Mont. 
1998) (holding that a thermal imager did not invade the defendant’s expectation 
of privacy because the imager did not emit beams or rays into the defendant’s
house, could not detect movement, and did not reveal interior walls).
66. 62 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1995).
10
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Eleventh Circuit held that society would not deem the use of a 
thermal imager as violating an objectively reasonable expectation 
of privacy because “[n]o revelation of intimate, even definitive, 
detail within the house was detectable; there was merely a gross, 
nondiscrete bright image indicating the heat emitted from the 
residence.”67  Most thermal imagers used by law enforcement can 
only display hotter and cooler areas of a house.68  The thermal 
scans are usually not accurate enough to display the identity of the 
object giving off the heat.69
b. Analogy to Discarded Garbage
In ruling that an individual lacks a subjective expectation of 
privacy in the case of thermal scans,70 several courts have likened 
heat escaping from a home to discarded garbage.71  These courts 
rationalize that the question of constitutionality regarding
warrantless thermal imager scans should be decided by examining 
the past precedence of police rummaging warrantlessly through 
garbage discarded on the curb.72
67. Id. at 1330. The DEA was informed that thirty sodium lights, most 
commonly used for marijuana cultivation, were being shipped to the defendant, 
Theodore Robinson. Id. at 1327.  In addition, utility statements showed that the 
defendant was using an inordinate amount of electricity. Id. The DEA conducted
an aerial search with a thermal imager and discovered defendant’s house was 
considerably warmer than the surrounding houses. Id. A search warrant was 
issued and a marijuana operation was discovered within the house along with a 
number of guns. Id. at 1327-28.  The defendant moved to suppress the evidence 
obtained from his home arguing the warrantless thermal imagery scan was a 
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Id at 1328.
The court found that the defendant did nothing to conceal the heat from
the marijuana lights from escaping from his home. Id. at 1329.  Therefore, the 
defendant’s inaction did not demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy. See
id. Furthermore, the court held that the thermal imager only displayed crude 
images of heat that did not reveal intimate details, and society was not willing to 
recognize privacy as objectively reasonable. Id. at 1329-31.
68. Yeager, supra note 35, at § 1.
69. Id.
70. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
71. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 35 (1988) (holding that the 
warrantless search of discarded garbage is not a violation of the Fourth
Amendment).
72. Pinson, 24 F.3d. at 1058 (likening heat emissions to garbage left on the 
curb); Myers, 46 F.3d at 668; Ford, 34 F.3d at 997; LaFollette v. Com. 915 S.W.2d 
747 (Ky. 1996) (ruling defendants do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
regarding discarded inculpatory items); State v. McKee, 510 N.W.2d 807, 809 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 1993) (relying on the analogy of heat emissions to leaving garbage on the 
curb, court found privacy was not one society was willing to accept as reasonable).
11
Heydt: The Fourth Amendment Heats Up: The Constitutionality of Thermal I
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2003
HEYDT FORMATTED.DOC 2/7/2003 2:39 PM
992 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:3
In California v. Greenwood,73 the United States Supreme Court
considered whether the Fourth Amendment prohibited the
warrantless search and seizure of discarded garbage left on the 
curbside of a private home.74  The Supreme Court observed that 
the defendant could not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in such discarded items that are so open for public inspection.75
“[P]olice cannot reasonably be expected to avert their eyes from 
evidence of criminal activity that could have been observed by any
member of the public.”76  The Court held that the warrantless 
search and seizure of discarded garbage was not a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.77
Courts addressing the constitutionally of thermal imaging
point out that thermal imaging scans typically only measure the 
amount of heat allowed to radiate from a house or structure.78
Since individuals do not prevent heat from escaping from their 
houses and, in most cases, are trying to vent heat from their houses, 
escaping heat is essentially no more than “abandoned heat” or 
“heat waste.”79  In Ford v. United States,80 the Eleventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals held “[t]he heat that Ford [defendant] intentionally 
vented from his mobile home was a waste byproduct of his
marijuana cultivation and is analogous to the inculpatory items that 
73. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
74. Id. at 37.  A California police officer, suspecting respondent Greenwood 
was involved in drug trafficking, had a trash collector pick up Greenwood’s 
garbage bags left on the curb in front of his house and give them to the police. Id
at 36.  The officer searched the trash bags and found evidence of drug trafficking.
Id. at 37-38. Using prior information along with the information gained from the 
trash search, the police officer was able to obtain a search warrant. Id. at 38. While 
searching, police found quantities of cocaine and hashish within the house. Id.
Greenwood was arrested on felony narcotic charges. Id.
75. Id. at 41.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Yeager, supra note 35, at §2(a).
79. United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668, 669-70 (7th Cir. 1995) (ruling in a 
case where defendant purposefully released heat through vents in the roof, that 
defendant had no subjective expectation of privacy because he took no steps in 
containing his heat emissions); United States v. Domitrovich, 852 F. Supp. 1460, 
1475 (1994) (ruling that use of exhaust fans to vent air from marijuana operation
did not exhibit a subjective expectation of privacy because heat vapors were 
exposed to public observation); United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 
226 (D.Haw. 1991), aff’d, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993) (defining the by-product
of heat from indoor marijuana cultivation as “abandoned heat” or “heat waste,” 
and exposing that heat waste failed to show an expectation of privacy).
80. 34 F.3d 992 (11th Cir. 1994).
12
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the respondents in Greenwood discarded in their trash.”81
Therefore, many courts have ruled that the use of thermal imagers 
without a warrant is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment by 
rationalizing, based on Greenwood, that discarding heat is the same 
as discarding garbage.82
c. Analogy to Narcotic Scents Detected by Trained Canines
Several courts have compared heat waste detected by thermal 
imagers to scents detected by trained police dogs in holding that 
the warrantless use of thermal imagers is not a search.83  Taking 
advantage of a canine’s ability to smell, police have trained dogs to 
sniff out and locate narcotic contraband.84  In United States v. Place,85
the United States Supreme Court held that a trained dog’s ability 
to smell and locate narcotics was not a search under the Fourth 
Amendment because it was non-intrusive.86 The Supreme Court 
commented on how unobtrusive the investigative technique of a 
“canine sniff” by well-trained narcotics detection dogs is compared
to a regular search.87  Whereas an ordinary search requires an 
81. Id. at 997.  In 1991, agents of the Florida Police Department, acting upon 
suspicion of indoor marijuana cultivation, used a thermal imager on Jerry Ford’s 
mobile home. Id. at 992.  The scan revealed an inordinate amount of heat 
escaping from the home similar to other indoor marijuana operations. Id.  A 
search warrant was issued based on the thermal imagery scan and other
information and upon searching the mobile home, a sophisticated hydroponic 
laboratory and over 400 marijuana plants were found. Id.  Ford was arrested for 
conspiracy and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Id.  Ford moved 
to suppress the evidence seized from his mobile home, arguing that the thermal 
imagery scan was a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Id.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, upholding the district court 
decision, found that the thermal imagery scan did not violate Ford’s Fourth 
Amendment rights. Id. at 997. Ford did not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy regarding the heat waste because he did little to prevent the heat from 
escaping from his home. See id.
82. United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1058 (8th Cir. 1994); United States 
v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668, 670 (7th Cir. 1995); Ford, 34 F.3d at 997; LaFollette v. Com. 
915 S.W.2d at 749 (Ky. 1996); State v. McKee, 510 N.W.2d 807, 809 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1993).
83. Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1058 (comparing thermal imaging to canine sniffs); see
also LaFollette, 915 S.W.2d at 750; State v. Niel, 671 So. 2d 1111, 1111-12 (La. Ct. 
App. 1996); McKee, 510 N.W.2d at 809; United States v. Deaner, 1992 WL 209966, 
at *4 (M.D. Pa. July 27, 1992).
84. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 696 (1983).
85. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
86. Id. at 707.
87. Id. The non-intrusive search ensures that the suspect is not subject to 
embarrassment and inconvenience associated with ordinary searches. Id.
13
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officer to open a suspect’s luggage and rummage within, the canine
sniff requires the dog only to sniff the unopened luggage to 
determine whether there is drug contraband inside.88
In thermal imaging cases, courts using the canine sniff analogy
treat a thermal imager’s ability to measure heat as the functional
equivalent of a dog’s ability to smell narcotics.89  In United States v. 
Pinson,90 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that “[j]ust as an 
odor escapes a compartment or building and is detected by the 
sense-enhancing instrument of a canine sniff, so also does heat 
escape a home and is detected by the . . . [thermal imager].”91
Courts have held that thermal scans are non-intrusive like canine 
sniffs.92  Therefore, an individual does not have a subjective
expectation of privacy regarding thermal scans and,
correspondingly, a thermal scan is not a search under the Fourth 
Amendment.93
2. Rulings that Thermal Imagers Are a Search under the 
Fourth Amendment
A number of courts have ruled that the warrantless use of 
thermal imagers is a search and, therefore, a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.94  These courts also applied the Katz test, but 
acknowledged an individual’s subjective expectation of privacy and 
society’s willingness to recognize that expectation as reasonable.95
88. Id.  The Court concluded that because the respondent exposed his 
luggage in a public place to a trained dog, the “canine sniff” did not constitute a 
search under the Fourth Amendment. Id.
89. Campisi, supra note 30, at 252-54.
90. 24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 1994).
91. Id. at 1058.
92. See cases cited supra note 83.
93. Pinson, 24 F.3d. at 1059.  See also LaFollette v. Com. 915 S.W.2d 747, 750 
(Ky. 1996); State v. Niel, 671 So.2d 1111, 1112 (La. Ct. App. 1996); State v. McKee, 
510 N.W.2d 807, 810 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993); United States v. Deaner, 1992 WL 
209966, at *4 (M.D. Pa. July 17, 1992).
94. United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1510 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding 
thermal imaging was a search); People v. Deutsch, 44 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1231
(1996); State v. Siegel, 934 P.2d 176, 180 (Mont. 1997), reversed on other grounds by 
970 P.2d. 556 (Mont. 1998) (noting that thermal imaging is a search under 
Montana’s constitution); Commonwealth v. Gindlesperger, 743 A.2d 898, 898 (Pa. 
1999) (holding thermal imaging is a search); State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 604 
(Wash. 1994).
95. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)(stating the two prongs of the test required to pass in order to hold 
the police activity in violation of the Fourth Amendment).
14
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Oftentimes, courts that find thermal imaging constitutes a search, 
posit their rulings on how the rationales in conflicting rulings were 
inferior and wrong.96
Many courts have ruled that thermal imagers are not passive 
non-intrusive devices, but rather are devices actively used to intrude
upon the personal security and sanctity of a home.  The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Gindlesperger97 held 
thermal imagers to be devices that are “constitutionally repugnant” 
because they “do, in fact, reveal intimate details regarding activities 
occurring within the sanctity of the home, the place deserving the 
utmost protection pursuant to the Fourth Amendment.”98  It 
follows, then, that law enforcement’s ability to distinguish personal 
details within the home with the use of thermal imagers violates the 
personal security and sanctity afforded to individuals under the 
Fourth Amendment.99
In State v. Young,100 the Washington Supreme Court rejected 
the garbage analogy and held that a thermal image scan is a 
96. Lomas, supra note 33 at 821 (calling faulty those courts that found no 
intrusion); see Deutsch, 44 Cal. App. 4th at 1232 (stating that although most courts 
sanction the use of thermal imagers “[a] much smaller body of case law has 
rejected that view, and represents the better reasoned authority as applied to 
thermal imaging scans of private residences.”).
97. 743 A.2d 898 (Pa. 1999).
98. Id. at 901-02.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a thermal image 
scan constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 906.  In 1994, 
police entered the suspect’s house under a search warrant and discovered twenty-
one marijuana plants. Id. at 898.  Probable cause for the search warrant was based 
on information from an informant and information that was collected by a 
thermal imager scan, which detected an inordinate amount of heat in the
suspect’s basement. Id. at 898-99.  Defendant was arrested and charged with 
various violations of Pennsylvania drug laws. Id. at 899.  Defendant’s motion to 
suppress the evidence seized during the search was denied and, in a bench trial, 
he was found guilty of all charges. Id.
The Superior Court reversed the suppression motion, holding that the 
warrantless use of the thermal imager was a search and violated the Fourth
Amendment. Id.  The results of the scanning device to obtain a search warrant 
“were invalid and not a proper basis for issuance of the warrant.” Id.
99. Gindlesperger, 743 A.2d 898, 900 (Pa. 1999); State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 
603 (Wash. 1994) (finding that infrared surveillance [thermal imager] intruded 
upon a person’s private affairs).  See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S 573, 600 (1980) 
(holding the searches and seizures in public places are treated differently than 
searches and seizures occurring in the home); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 
505, 511 (1961) (stating the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there 
be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion stands at the ‘very core’ of the 
Fourth Amendment).
100. 867 P.2d 593 (Wash. 1994).
15
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violation of the Fourth Amendment.101  The Young court noted that 
thermal image scans are different from discarded garbage in two 
important ways.102  First, an individual deliberately chooses items 
they want discarded and sets those items out on the curb.103  An 
individual does not deliberately participate in the venting of heat 
measured by thermal imagers.104  Second, while people can
reasonably foresee an animal or a person rummaging through their 
garbage cans, people do not expect the use of sophisticated
thermal imagers on their homes.105  Therefore, an individual has an 
expectation of privacy that society will recognize regarding heat 
waste because heat loss is inevitable and an individual would not 
reasonably expect it to be measured.106
In United States v. Cusumano,107 the Tenth Circuit found that 
the constitutionality of a canine sniff should not be compared to 
the use of a thermal imager.108  The court agreed that a thermal 
imager, like a canine sniff, does extract internal information in a 
relatively non-intrusive manner.109  However, the intrusiveness of 
information obtained in both methods is not the same.110  A canine 
101. Id at 601. In 1990, Detective Miller received numerous tips that Robert 
Young was running a “big marijuana grow” inside his house. Id. at 595.  Detective
Miller conducted a thermal search of Young’s house which indicated there was an 
inordinate amount of heat coming from the basement. Id.  Based on the previous 
information and the thermal scan, Detective Miller obtained a search warrant, and 
the search produced a large quantity of marijuana. Id.  Young was charged with 
intent to manufacture and deliver. Id.  Young moved to suppress the evidence, but 
the trial court denied the motion and found Young guilty on the stipulated facts.
Id.
The Washington Supreme Court heard the motion on petition and
reversed the trial court. Id.  The court found that thermal searches violate an 
individual’s Fourth Amendment rights because the Fourth Amendment affords 
increased protection within a person’s home. Id. at 601.
102. Id. at 601-03.
103. Id. at 603.
104. Id.
105. State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 603 (Wash. 1994).
106. See id.
107. 83 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1996).
108. Id.  The Tenth Circuit Panel found that the use of the thermal imager 
violated the Fourth Amendment.  However, the court, sitting en banc, vacated the 
decision and decided the case without reaching the issue of the constitutionality of 
thermal imagery. WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 2.2 (3d ed. 1999) (stating 
that the Tenth Circuit’s ruling that thermal imaging was unconstitutional was 
“[t]he most exhaustive and compelling analysis of the issue”); United States v. 
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 696 (1983) (holding warrantless canine sniffs as
constitutional).
109. Cusumano, 67 F.3d at 1508.
110. See id.
16
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sniff only reveals the presence of narcotics that an individual is 
illegally possessing.111 A thermal imager, however, is less
discriminate and much more intrusive, revealing all activity that 
emanates heat.112  The court held that “because the imager lacks 
the precision of the dog sniff, we should not extend Place to allow 
the warrantless use of thermal imagers upon a home.”113  The court 
further reasoned that an individual has an expectation of privacy 
that society will recognize because society will not allow
government to intrude into a person’s home without a warrant.114
III. THE KYLLO DECISION
A. The Facts
In 1991, Agent William Elliot (Agent Elliot) of the United 
States Department of the Interior suspected the claimant, Danny 
Kyllo (Kyllo), was growing marijuana within his residence.115
Without a warrant, Agent Elliot parked across the street from 
Kyllo’s home and scanned the home with a thermal imager.116
Agent Elliot was searching for the inordinate amounts of heat 
created from the high-intensity lights used for growing
marijuana.117  The thermal scan showed that the roof and walls of 
the garage were emitting a relatively large amount of heat
compared to the rest of the house and other surrounding houses in 
the neighborhood.118  Three circles, which closely resembled
heating lamps used in indoor marijuana cultivation, could be 
111. Id. (stating that a dog sniff cannot reveal information about conduct or 
activity that an individual has a right to pursue). See Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
112. Cusumano, 67 F.3d at 1508; People v. Deutsch, 44 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1231
(1996) (“Precisely because the thermal imager is indiscriminate in registering 
sources of heat it is an intrusive tool, which tells much about the activities inside 
the home which may be quite unrelated to any illicit activity.”).
113. Cusumano, 67 F.3d at 1508 (10th Cir. 1995). See Deutsch, 44 Cal. App. 4th 
at 1231 (arguing that thermal imagers are “the very antithesis of a dog sniff
because the trained narcotics dog alerts only in the presence of contraband”).
114. Cusumano, 67 F.3d. at 1508.
115. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).
116. Id.  Agent Elliot used an Agema Thermovision 210 thermal imager, which 
showed a relatively crude image of the heat radiating out of the Kyllo’s house. Id.
Agent Elliot used the thermal imaging device from a public street scanning both 
the front and back of Kyllo’s house. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 30.
17
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spotted on the roof of the garage through the imager.119  Based on 
these thermal-imaging projections, tips from informants and the 
suspect’s utility bills, a Federal Magistrate Judge issued a warrant 
authorizing a search of Kyllo’s home.120  Upon searching Kyllo’s 
house, police found over 100 illegal marijuana plants growing 
inside the garage.121
Kyllo was indicted on federal drug charges.122  Kyllo
unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence seized from his home 
detected by the thermal imager and then entered a conditional 
guilty plea.123  The Ninth Circuit originally held that the thermal 
imagery of Kyllo’s home was a violation of his constitutional
rights.124  However, the government was granted a Petition for a 
Panel Rehearing, and a full Ninth Circuit Panel heard the case.125
The Ninth Circuit, affirming the lower court decision, found 
Kyllo’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated.126  The use of 
the thermal imager was not considered a search because Kyllo did 
not attempt to conceal the heat escaping and “[n]o intimate details 
of the home were observed.”127  Therefore, the evidence was 
allowed.128
B. Supreme Court’s Analysis
In a five to four decision, with Justice Scalia delivering the 
opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
and found that the use of a thermal imaging device on a private 
home constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.129
119. Id. Agent Elliott concluded from his scan that Kyllo was using halide 
lights to grow marijuana, which was later found to be correct. Id.
120. Id.
121. Kyllo v. United States, 522 U.S. 27, 30 (2001).
122. Id.  Kyllo was in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and indicted for 
manufacturing marijuana. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.  This opinion was withdrawn and a change of composition took place 
within the panel. Id.
125. Id.
126. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31.
127. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that Kyllo had no subjective expectation of 
privacy because he did not conceal the heat lost and, even if he had, the thermal 
imager did not expose intimate details of Kyllo’s life, only the “hot spots” made 
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In defining what constitutes a search, the Court used the 
principle established in Katz v. United States,130 which held that “[a] 
search does not occur . . . unless the individual manifested a 
subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged 
search, and society is willing to recognize that expectation as
reasonable.”131  According to the Katz test, the Supreme Court held 
that society has recognized an expectation of personal privacy
regarding the interior of a private home as reasonable.132
Therefore, a search includes the use of any type of sense-enhancing
technology, such as the thermal imager, to investigate information 
that could not be otherwise accessible without “physical intrusion 
into a constitutionally protected area.”133  The thermal imager used 
on Kyllo’s home collected information about the interior of his 
home that, prior to sense-enhancing devices, could not be obtained 
without entering the house.134  Therefore, the use of the thermal 
imager constituted a search and a violation of Kyllo’s Fourth
Amendment rights.135
The government argued that a thermal imager is not a
“search” because a thermal imager does not penetrate the house, 
but merely detects “heat radiating from the external surface of the 
house.”136  The dissenting Justices agreed with the government’s 
argument, believing that there should be a distinction between “off-
the-wall-surveillance,” which should not constitute a Fourth
Amendment search, versus “through-the-wall-surveillance,” which 
should be considered a search.137  The dissent argued that with 
“through-the-wall-surveillance” an observer has direct access to the 
information being sought.  However, “off-the-wall-surveillance” is a 
technique where the observer does not have direct access, but must 
make inferences and deductions about what might be happening 
130. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967).
131. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S 207, 211 (1986); accord Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 
(Harlan, J., concurring).
132. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
133. Id. at 33 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 505 (1961).
However, this definition of “search” is conditioned on whether or not the
technology is readily available for general public use, which this Court determines 
thermal imagers are not. Id.
134. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 39.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 35 (quoting Brief for the United States Government at 26, Kyllo v. 
United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001)).
137. Id. at 35.
19
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within the home.138  Since this type of thermal imager does not 
directly invade an individual’s home and does not reveal intimate 
details of that home, the dissent believed that this was not a search 
and Kyllo’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated.139
The majority opinion rejected the distinction between “off-the-
wall” and “through-the-wall” surveillances, noting that the most 
sophisticated thermal imaging devices used “off-the-wall”
technology.140  The majority further rejected the dissent’s
“extraordinary assertion that anything learned through ‘an inference’ 
cannot be searched.”141  With the government’s increasingly
sophisticated use of thermal imagery, few inferences will have to be 
made by law enforcement.142  Furthermore, previous case law has 
shown that an investigation based on an inference can be an 
unlawful search.143
The government also argued that thermal imaging was
constitutional because it did not detect intimate details taking place 
within private areas.144  They based part of their argument on Dow
Chemical Co. v. United States,145 in which enhanced aerial
photographs146 of the private property of an industrial complex did 
not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.147  The 
Court explained that Dow Chemical dealt with the investigation of an 
industrial complex, which does not share the same protection 
138. Id. at 41.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 35.
141. Id. (emphasis added).
142. See http://www.nlectc.org/techproj/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2001) (stating 
the goal of the National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center is 
to possess the ability to see individuals through interior building walls with thermal 
imaging technology).
143. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001).  The Court acknowledges
that the dissent believes the Court has “misunderstood its point, which is not that 
inference insulates a search, but that inference alone is not a search.” Id. at 36.
The Court notes that such a misunderstanding was made to show how this point is 
germane to the issue at hand; if an inference is not a search, that has nothing to 
do with addressing the question of whether the measurement of heat by the 
thermal imager is a search. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 705 (1984) 
(holding that where a police officer “inferred” that a beeper on a can of ether was 
in a home, the police search was still considered to be an unlawful search).
144. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38.
145. Dow Chemical v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
146. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32-38 (concluding that enhanced aerial photography is a 
sense-enhancing technology, however, it is constitutional in this instance because
the information sought after was not the interior of a private home, but the private 
property of an industrial site).
147. Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 238.
20
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under the Fourth Amendment as, in this case, the interior of a 
house.148  “[P]hysical invasion of the structure of the home, ‘by 
even a fraction of an inch,’ [is] too much.”149  Individuals should be 
protected within the sanctity of their homes.150  In the home “all
details, are intimate details, because the entire area is safe from 
prying government eyes.”151  The government also contended that 
the Agema Thermovision 210 is a crude thermal imaging device.152
The imager did not reveal intimate details of the suspect within the 
house; the imager only showed three spots of heat that resembled 
heat lamps on the roof of the suspect’s house.153  The Court 
disagreed with the government’s argument, concluding that the 
Agema Thermovision 210 could reveal very intimate details of an 
individual’s life.154  For example, the thermal imager can detect the 
exact time and location where a person is taking a bath because the 
heat radiating from the water can be detected by the imager.155
Regardless of the intimacy of information obtained, “[t]he Fourth 
Amendment’s protection of the home has never been tied to 
measurement of the quality or quantity of information obtained.”156
Therefore, whether a thermal imager detects a suspect taking a hot 
bath or turning on closet lights, that information is intimate and 
should be protected under the Fourth Amendment.157
The majority in Kyllo wanted to draw a firm, bright line 
regarding what constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment.158
The Court wanted to establish what methods of surveillance require 
148. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001).
149. Id. (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)).
150. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. (affording the right of an individual to be secure 
in their home).
151. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37.  Other cases show all information within the home is 
intimate. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 705 (1984) (holding that the 
privacy regarding the presence of a can of ether in a home was an intimate detail); 
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 321 (1987) (ruling that the registration number of 
a phonograph turntable was an intimate detail because it was within the interior of 
the home and not in plain sight).
152. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38.  The Agema Thermovision 210 is crude in the sense 
that other, more sophisticated, thermal imagers on the market have the capability
to detect a human’s location and movements within a structure. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. The Court related how the Agema Thermovision 210 could reveal 
what hour of each night a lady takes her daily sauna, which would be considered a 
very intimate detail of this lady’s life. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 39.
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a warrant and also address future concerns regarding the ever-
increasing advancements of law enforcement’s investigative
technology.159  “The Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the 
light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when 
it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public
interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens.”160
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE KYLLO DECISION
The Supreme Court correctly ruled, in a surprisingly diverse 
five to four decision,161 that the use of a thermal imager is a search 
that requires a search warrant under the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution.162  However, the Supreme Court
overstepped its bounds when it provided an all-encompassing rule 
for all sense-enhancing surveillance technology.
A. Violation of the Katz Test and the Fourth Amendment
As the main interpreter of the Constitution,163 the Supreme 
Court flexed its interpretive muscles by holding that the warrantless 
use of thermal imagers is a violation of the Fourth Amendment.164
In examining the Katz test,165 the Supreme Court took a different 
approach than the steadfast rationales used by previous courts that 
analogized discarded garbage or dog sniffs to prove the
constitutionality of thermal imagers.166  The Supreme Court
recognized the increased protection afforded to individuals’ homes 
and held that in searches of homes’ interiors “there is a ready 
criterion . . . of the minimal expectation of privacy that exists, and 
159. Id.
160. Carrol v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
161. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 28.  There was an unusual ideological division among 
the Justices regarding who joined the opinion and who dissented.  Justice Scalia 
delivered the opinion of the Court, which Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer, 
joined.  Justice Stevens filed the dissenting opinion, which Rehnquist, O’Connor, 
and Kennedy, joined. See David G. Savage, Taking a Page From History: Old English, 
Colonial Law Revisited in Pot Scanning, 87 A.B.A. J. 32, 34 (2001) (“If ever there was 
an oddcouple lineup among the justices, this was it. Scalia’s opinion was joined by 
his fellow history buffs, Justices Souter and Clarence Thomas, as well as by the 
more liberal Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer.”).
162. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 39.
163. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (holding the basic principle that 
the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution).
164. See Kyllo v. United States,  533 U.S. at 32-34.
165. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
166. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33.
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that is acknowledged to be reasonable.”167  This minimal expectation 
is premised on common law and the intent behind the Fourth 
Amendment.168  The Court correctly ruled that the warrantless use 
of thermal imagery by police intruded on an individual’s
expectation of privacy, and to allow this minimum expectation to 
be violated would in effect “erode the privacy guaranteed by the 
Fourth Amendment.”169
To arrive at their opinion, the Supreme Court relied primarily 
on interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.170  The Court could 
have strengthened its opinion by addressing the analogies made in 
previous lower court decisions.  As previously discussed, lower 
courts had repeatedly compared the device to the legal status of 
discarded garbage and/or of dog sniffs.171  The Supreme Court 
could have decided on the validity of these comparisons, ruling 
presumably that thermal imagery is different from discarded
garbage and dog sniffs.
Before the Supreme Court’s decision, the majority of courts 
upheld the argument that lost heat measured by thermal imagers is 
analogous to discarded garbage and/or dog sniffs, while the
minority of courts dismissed those very same analogies.172  The 
courts in the minority had a stronger argument and the Supreme 
Court could have strengthened its decision by agreeing with them.
The analogy between lost heat and discarded garbage is a weak 
comparison.173  In cases of discarded garbage, items are
intentionally placed in garbage receptacles and left on the curb.174
One can reasonably expect the garbage to be rummaged through 
by an animal or person.175  Heat, on the other hand, is not always 
intentionally lost.176  People do not reasonably expect that their 
167. Id.
168. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 
(1961) (holding that a man has the right “to retreat into his own home and there 
be free from unreasonable government searches”).
169. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34.
170. Id. at 32-41.
171. For a discussion of the analogies by the majority of courts who found 
thermal imagery not a search, see supra notes 53-92 and corresponding text.  For a 
discussion of the analogies by the minority courts who found thermal imagery was 
a search, see supra notes 93-116 and corresponding text.
172. Campisi, supra note 30, at 247.
173. See State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 601 (Wash. 1994) (criticizing the analogy 
between lost heat and discarded garbage).
174. See id. at 603.
175. Id. at 603.
176. See State v. Siedgel, 934 P.2d 176, 186 (Mont. 1997), reversed on other 
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heat is being measured by a sophisticated thermal imager across 
the street.177
Moreover, the analogy of a dog sniff to a thermal imager is also 
a weak analogy.178  A dog sniff only detects illegal contraband.179  A 
thermal imager scan does not discern between legal and illegal 
activity.180 The imager is as likely to display legal activities as it is to 
display illegal activities within the home.181
By addressing the ineptitude of these analogies, the Supreme 
Court could have further supported its claim that thermal imaging
was a search.182  By addressing these analogies, the Court could 
have also parried Justice Stevens’ dissent by noting the
ineffectiveness of a rationale comparing lost heat to discarded 
garbage.183  Instead, the Court relied on categorizing certain sense-
enhancing technology as searches if the technology is not available 
for the “general public use.”184  This standard could foreseeably 
create a troubling dilemma in the future considering “that the 
amount of privacy that is available from the public . . . wanes every 
day as we become more technologically advanced and technology 
becomes more available.”185
Therefore, though the Supreme Court correctly ruled that 
thermal imaging is a search and in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, the Court should have strengthened its opinion by 
dismissing the analogies used by lower courts and the dissent.
B. An Effective Rule for Thermal Imagers, but Not 
Other Surveillance Technology
The military is currently using highly sophisticated
surveillance, and it is only a matter of time before this technology is
grounds (stating that, based on the laws of thermodynamics, heat escapes no matter 
how much people insulate their houses).
177. See Young, 867 P.2d at 603.




182. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
183. Kyllo, 53 U.S. at 47-50. See Johnathan Ringle, Court Restricts Use of Heat 
Sensors, AM. LAW. MEDIA, June 12, 2001, at SF1 (stating that within Justice Stevens’ 
dissent the Justice made comparisons with cases regarding seized garbage left for 
collection with lost heat measured by thermal imagers).
184. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47.
185. Symposium, Modern Studies of Privacy Law Introduction: Keeping Secrets, 86 
MINN. L. REV. 1097, 1109 (2002).
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also available to law enforcement.186  In Kyllo, the Supreme Court 
constructs a broad rule that attempts to provide guidance for not 
only the use of thermal imagers, but for all future sophisticated 
sense-enhancing surveillance systems.187  The Kyllo rule states that 
“obtaining [1] by sense-enhancing technology [2] any information 
regarding the interior of the home [3] that could not otherwise 
have been obtained without physical intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area . . . [4] at least where (as here) the 
technology in question is not in general public use” is considered a 
search.188  While the Kyllo rule provides an effective means for 
dealing with the continued sophistication of thermal imagers,189 it 
fails to provide an effective means to generally account for the 
advancement of sense-enhancing technology.190
The Kyllo rule is effective for thermal imagers because it clearly 
addresses the numerous concerns regarding the continuing degree 
of intrusiveness of thermal imagers within private homes.191  With 
the possible future ability of measuring human heartbeats behind a 
wall, the Kyllo rule could prevent the warrantless use of thermal 
images as their capabilities continue to advance and threaten 
privacy.192  However, as Justice Stevens states within the dissent, “the 
category of ‘sense-enhancing technology’ covered by the new rule 
is far too broad.”193
While the Supreme Court correctly ruled that the use of 
thermal imagers is a search and violates the Fourth Amendment, 
the Court should not have applied this rule to all sense-enhancing
technology.  The Kyllo rule could be interpreted broadly enough to 
prevent the use of dog sniffs to detect illegal contraband such as 
narcotics from a home.194  Applying the elements of the Kyllo rule,
186. Campisi, supra note 30, at 271.
187. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. at 47 (2001).
188. Id.  Justice Stevens’ dissent is used to cite the Kyllo rule because it clearly 
sets forth the four factors that the rule requires in finding the sense-enhancing
technology is a search under the Fourth Amendment.
189. See id. at 39; see Gibeauit, supra note 162, at 34 (suggesting a new Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence which keeps pace with thermal imagery advancement).
190. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
191. See id.
192. See United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1510 (10th Cir. 1995)
(McKay, J., dissenting) (noting that thermal imagers have the ability to recognize
distinct images, and that this technology is becoming available to law
enforcement).
193. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47.
194. See id.
25
Heydt: The Fourth Amendment Heats Up: The Constitutionality of Thermal I
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2003
HEYDT FORMATTED.DOC 2/7/2003 2:39 PM
1006 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:3
arguably, dog sniffs could be defined as sense-enhancing
technology that collects information about the inside of the house 
(odors).195  This information could not be attained otherwise
without physical intrusion,196 since trained dogs are not available to 
the general public.197  Therefore, the use of trained dogs by police 
to sniff out narcotics could be held unconstitutional under the 
Kyllo test.198  This rule would overrule United States v. Place and thus 
prohibit a very successful and virtually non-intrusive police activity 
that identifies nothing but illegal activity.199  Justice Steven’s dissent 
even suggests the Kyllo rule could be carried as far as forbidding a 
law officer from using an infrared camera to detect a person 
entering a house with a pizza at night.200  The use of the infrared 
camera would constitute a search because the sense-enhancing
technology could spot a person at night with a pizza that could not 
be seen during the day.201  The officer would know about the 
interior of the house by making the inference that someone likes 
pizza within that house.202  Infrared cameras are not readily
available to the public; therefore, this could be considered a search 
under the Kyllo rule.203  Even though this hypothetical may have 
over-exaggerated the application of the Kyllo rule, it does raise 
important questions about how far Kyllo will be applied in the 
future.204  Therefore, the Supreme Court in Kyllo correctly ruled 
that the use of thermal imagers constituted a search, however, the 
Court applied this rule too broadly when trying to restrict all sense-
enhancing technology.
C. The Kyllo Rule Relative to the September 11, 2001 
Terrorist Attacks
While the decision in Kyllo v. United States was based on illegal 
drug production, the rule developed in Kyllo restricting the use of 
sense-enhancing technology could be especially poignant in the 
195. See id.
196. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 696 (1983).
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wake of recent terrorist attacks.205  After the World Trade Center 
and Pentagon attacks on September 11, 2001, American public 
sentiment showed that many were willing to sacrifice their personal 
freedoms to prevent future terrorist attacks.206  However, if the all-
encompassing rule in Kyllo is enforced and thereby restricts law 
enforcement agencies’ use of not only thermal imagers but all 
sense-enhancing technology, the search for terrorists and the
prevention of future terrorist attacks could be hampered.207
Details of the infamous September 11, 2001, are well known to 
all.  In a terrorist plot, attributed to the group al-Qaeda,208 four 
American passenger planes were hijacked and crashed into pre-
determined U.S. targets.  Three of the four planes reached their 
planned destinations.  American Airlines Flight 11 and United 
Airlines Flight 175 crashed into the North and South Towers of the 
World Trade Center in New York City, while a third plane,
American Airlines Flight 77, slammed into the Pentagon in
Washington D.C.209  A fourth plane, United Airlines Flight 93, was 
diverted from the hijackers’ planned target by the passengers’ 
205. Peter H. King & Shawn Hubler, America Attacked: After the Violence, a Nation
on Edge, Society: Effects of Last Week’s Terror Will Reach Beyond Heightened Airport 
Security to Entertainment, Politics and Much More, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2001, at A3 
(quoting Jeffrey S. Weiner, former president of the National Assn. of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers, “[l]ittle is left of the 4th Amendment . . . [the 4th Amendment] 
will certainly be in jeopardy in the light of these horrific events”).
206. See Michael Elliot, America On Guard: A Clear and Present Danger, TIME, Oct. 
8, 2001, at 28-29.  In a Time/CNN poll, sixty-eight percent of those interviewed
would favor allowing law enforcement to wiretap phones of suspected terrorists 
without permission from the courts. Id.  Fifty-five percent would favor law 
enforcement intercepting e-mail messages without court permission, searching for 
suspicious words and phrases. Id. See King & Hubler, supra note 205 (stating that 
a Los Angeles Times poll found overwhelming support for random police stops); 
Brigid McMenamin, Land Of The Free; We Already Have A Lot of Legal Tools To Fight 
Terrorism, FORBES MAGAZINE, Oct. 15, 2001, at 56 (quoting an ABC poll taken after 
September 11, 2001 that found “two out of three Americans are willing to
surrender civil liberties to stop terrorism”).
207. Symposium, supra note 185, at 1107 (discussing police power of
surveillance after events like September 11, and how that power may be affected by 
Kyllo v. United States).
208. David Firestone & Christopher Drew, A Nation Challenged: The Cases; Al 
Qaeda Link Seen in Only a Handful of 1,200 Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2001, at 
A1. See Liam Braber, Comment, Korematsu’s Ghost: A Post-September 11th Analysis of 
Race and National Security, 47 VILL. L. REV. 451, 451 (2002) (describing how the 
“[e]vidence soon suggested that Arab Islamic militants [al-Qaeda] backed by 
Osama bin Laden, a known anti-American terrorist, had committed the
massacre”).
209. Charles M. Madigan, ‘Our Nation Saw Evil’; Hijacked Jets Destroy World Trade
Center, Hit Pentagon, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 12, 2001, § 1, at 1.
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heroic efforts overpowering the terrorists and forcing the plane to 
crash in an open field in Somerset County, Pennsylvania.210
Thousands were killed from these horrific attacks211 and now 
Americans harbor a widespread fear that terrorists are apt to attack 
again.
The government promptly responded to these concerns in 
part by enacting the Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism Act of 2001 (“USA PATRIOT Act”) on October 26, 2001, 
just six weeks after the attacks of September 11, 2001.212 Without
delving into the dense and somewhat complex legislation involved 
in the USA PATRIOT Act, its purpose was to proactively protect 
against possible future terrorist threats within the United States by 
expanding the government’s use of wiretapping and electronic 
surveillance power,213 clamping down on illegal immigration and 
money laundering,214 providing swift relief to victims of terrorism,215
210. Id.
211. See Margaret Talbot, The Lives They Lived, 3,225 (At Last Count) Died 
September 11, 2001, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2001, §6, at 16; see also Michael C. 
Bonafede, Note, Here, There, And Everywhere: Assessing the Proportionality Doctrine and 
U.S. Uses of Force In Response To Terrorism After the September 11 Attacks, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 155, 215 n.13 (2002) (citing Eric Lipton, Death Toll Is Near 3,000, but Some 
Uncertainty Over the Count Remains, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2002, at G47 in tallying a 
list of those killed, which “excluding the 19 hijackers, consists of 2,801 killed or 
still missing from the World Trade Center, 184 killed at the Pentagon and 40 
killed on Flight 93, which crashed near Shanksville, Pa.”).
212. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).  The Act 
consists of ten provisions:
Title I—Enhancing Domestic Security Against Terrorism;
Title II—Enhanced Surveillance Procedures;
Title III—International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist
Financing Act of 2001;
Title IV—Protecting the Border;
Title V—Removing Obstacles to Investigating Terrorism;
Title VI—Providing for Victims of Terrorism, Public Safety Officers, and their 
Families;
Title VII—Increased Information Sharing for Critical Infrastructure Protection;
Title VIII—Strengthening the Criminal Laws Against Terrorism;
Title IX—Improved Intelligence; and
Title X—Miscellaneous.
Id.
213. Id. at §§ 201-225. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(e) (2000) (allowing an officer, 
in the normal course of his duty, to conduct electronic surveillance); 18 U.S.C. § 
2511(2)(i) (2000), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 217(2) (making it lawful for an 
officer to intercept a computer trespasser’s wire or electronic communication
involving a protected computer).
214. USA PATRIOT Act, §§ 301-428 Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 301-377
28
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and increasing information-sharing power between investigative 
agencies.216 Congress justified the USA PATRIOT Act as necessary 
in order to “deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and 
around the world, [and] to enhance law enforcement investigatory 
tools.”217  The Act has provided the government with increased 
surveillance and enforcement power to prevent against further 
terrorist acts.218  Many argue, however, that the government’s 
increased power to fight terrorism is at the cost of individuals’ 
personal privacy rights.219
With the demand for increased surveillance and enforcement 
power under the USA PATRIOT Act, sense-enhancing technology 
could be a valuable tool in helping to thwart terrorist plots.220
Through enhanced technology such as electronic wiretaps and 
bugs, law enforcement agencies can listen to those with suspected 
terrorist ties.221  Rather than narcotics, dogs can be trained to locate 
(2001). See Lisa Nelson, Protecting the Common Good: Technology, Objectivity, and 
Privacy, PUB. ADMIN. REV., Sept. 1, 2002 (stating that “[u]nder the [USA PATRIOT 
Act], financial institutions are required to monitor daily financial transactions 
even more closely and to share information with other federal agencies.  The 
[Act] provides for no judicial review and does not mandate that law enforcement 
give the person whose records are being reviewed any notice”).
215. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 611-624 (2001).
216. Id. at § 701. See Ending Terrorism, Investigation, Prosecution Before the House 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) [hereinafter Ashcroft, Ending Terrorism]
(statement of John Ashcroft, United States Attorney General), available at,
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/agcrisisremarks9_24.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2003)
(setting forth objectives of the USA PATRIOT Act).
217. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
218. Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and The Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 843, 913 (2002) (stating that the USA PATRIOT Act “has already 
expanded substantially the government’s ability to conduct surveillance on its 
citizens”).  See Ashcroft, Ending Terrorism, supra note 216 (quoting Attorney 
General John Ashcroft that the purpose of the Act was so “[l]aw enforcement 
[has] a strengthened and streamlined ability for our intelligence-gathering
abilities to gather the information necessary to disrupt, weaken and eliminate the 
infrastructure of terrorist organizations”).
219. See Jonathan Krim, Anti-Terror Push Stirs Fears for Liberties; Rights Groups 
Unite to Seek Safeguards, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2001, at A17 (reporting that “[a] 
coalition of public interest groups from across the political spectrum has formed 
to try to stop Congress and the Bush administration from rushing to enact 
counterterrorism measures before considering their effect on Americans’ privacy 
and civil rights”).
220. Ted Bridis & Gary Fields, Data Overload: Would the FBI Know What to Do 
With Its New Snooping Power?, WALL STREET J., Sept. 26, 2001, at A1 (describing how 
the White House is backing away from previous proposals to phase out enhanced 
surveillance capabilities in light of the recent bombings).
221. Deborah Barfield, America’s Ordeal: Critics Wary to Bid to Curtail Rights,
NEWSDAY, Oct. 2, 2001 (describing other incidents where wiretapping was used in 
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bomb material.222 Trap and trace devices223 and pen registers224 can 
be used to capture source and addressee information for computer 
(e.g., e-mail) and telephone conversations.225  Other sense-
enhancing devices “might detect the odor of deadly bacteria or 
chemicals for making a[n] . . . explosive.”226
It remains to be seen how the Kyllo decision will affect the 
continued use of these surveillance and enforcement devices.227  In 
an emergency, it is unclear whether law enforcement will be 
required to go through the lengthy process of obtaining a search 
warrant, as required under Kyllo, to use sense-enhancing
technology when there is a risk of losing a suspect who could be 
responsible for thousands of deaths.228  Regardless of the degree of 
pursuit of terrorists).
222. See, e.g, Global Training Academy, 
http://www.globalcorp.com/trainingacademy (last visited Jan. 23, 2003) (offering 
training programs for canines to sniff out drugs, land mines, and bombs).
223. The USA PATRIOT Act amends the definition of a “trap or trace device” 
as “a device or process which captures the incoming electronic or other impulses 
which identify the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, and 
signaling information reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or
electronic communication, provided, however, that such information shall not 
include the contents of any communication.”  18 U.S.C. § 3127(4), amended by USA 
PATRIOT Act § 216(c)(3), 115 Stat. 272, 290.
224. The USA PATRIOT Act also amended the definition of a “pen register” as 
“a device or process which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or 
signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or 
electronic communication is transmitted, provided, however, that such
information shall not include the contents of any communication, but such term 
does not include any device or process used by a provider or customer of a wire or 
electronic communication service for billing, or recording as an incident to 
billing, for communications services provided by such provider or any device or 
process used by a provider or customer or a wire communication service for cost 
accounting or other like purposes in the ordinary course of its business.”  18 
U.S.C. § 3127(3), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 216(c)(2), 115 Stat. 272, 290.
225. See 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a)(1), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 216(b)(1), 
115 Stat. 272, 288-89 (expanding the jurisdictional use of trap and trace devices 
and pen registers).
226. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 47 (2001).
227. McMenamin, supra note 206, at 56 (stating that a target for the anti-
liberties crowd is the Fourth Amendment which was reaffirmed by the Supreme 
Court in Kyllo v. United States).
228. See Ashcroft, Ending Terrorism, supra note 216 (quoting Attorney General 
John Ashcroft that “[l]aw enforcement needs a strengthened and streamlined 
ability for our intelligence-gathering abilities to gather the information necessary 
to disrupt, weaken and eliminate the infrastructure of terrorist organizations”);
William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2141 (2002)
(stating that “Fourth and Fifth Amendment law is likely to move toward greater 
authority for the police . . . . The natural conclusion is that we will see a loss of
individual liberty and privacy”).
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intrusiveness of these terrorism-fighting devices, under the overly 
broad rule in Kyllo, these devices could be restricted because they 
may be classified as sense-enhancing technology generally
unavailable to the public that reveals information within the
interior of a house, thereby constituting a search.229
Since the events of September 11, 2001, however, the United 
States Supreme Court has failed to address the constitutionality of 
the USA PATRIOT Act or to apply the Kyllo rule to the
government’s use of sense-enhancing technology for the search of 
terrorists.  This inaction may reflect a shift throughout the country, 
including the courts, of a willingness to sacrifice certain personal 
freedoms for public safety in fearful times.230  “With terrorism, our 
only defense might be infiltration and surveillance . . . so we’re 
going to have to choose between security and privacy.”231  Only the 
future will determine which alternative America chooses.
V. CONCLUSION
The Kyllo case presented the United States Supreme Court 
with an opportunity to explain why the warrantless use of thermal 
imagers on private homes is a search and thus a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.  The Supreme Court set forth a rule that not 
only regulates the current thermal imaging technology but also 
provides regulations for thermal imagery as its technology
continues to advance.
The Supreme Court was too broad in applying the Kyllo rule to 
not only thermal imagers, but also to other sense-enhancing
technology.  The Kyllo rule not only limits inherently intrusive 
sense-enhancing technology that should be deemed a search, it also 
could restrict successful and virtually non-intrusive sense-enhancing
technology that should not be deemed to constitute a search.  After 
229. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34-5.
230. Carrie L. Groskopf, Notes and Comments, If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It: The 
Supreme Court’s Unnecessary Departure From Precedent in Kyllo v. United States, 52
DEPAUL L. REV 201, 204 (2002) (stating that regardless of the Kyllo decision “the 
Court will probably bend over backwards to allow U.S. intelligence to take
whatever measures are necessary in order to ensure that more American lives are 
not lost in vain”). See Robin Toner, After the Attacks: Civil Liberties; Some Foresee a 
Change in Attitudes on Freedoms, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2001, at A16 (quoting Senator 
Trent Lott stating that, “[w]hen you are at war, civil liberties are treated
differently.  We cannot let what happened yesterday happen in the future”).
231. Toner, supra note 230, at A16 (quoting Walter Dellinger who served as 
acting solicitor general in the Clinton Administration).
31
Heydt: The Fourth Amendment Heats Up: The Constitutionality of Thermal I
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2003
HEYDT FORMATTED.DOC 2/7/2003 2:39 PM
1012 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:3
the horrific events of September 11, the Kyllo rule could potentially
hamper using sense-enhancing technology to successfully search 
for terrorists.  With passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, however, the 
courts are seemingly lenient and appear to be willing to tolerate 
the use of sense-enhancing technology to prevent another terrorist 
attack.
Therefore, the Supreme Court correctly ruled that thermal 
imagers should constitute a search.  The Court, however,
incorrectly ruled that their decision should include not only
thermal imagers but all sense-enhancing technology.232  The Court 
should attempt to refine its ruling in a way that better protects 
individual privacy in the face of rapidly evolving surveillance
technology, and rapidly evolving national security needs.233
232. See infra Part V.
233. David A. Sullivan, A Bright Line in the Sky? Toward a New Fourth Amendment
Search Standard for Advancing Surveillance Technology, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 967, 991 
(2002).
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